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Of All Things Made in America Why are
We Exporting the Penn Central Test?
Anthony B. Sanders*
Abstract
Developing countries enter into bilateral investment treaties ("BITs") in order
to increase foreign direct investment ("FDI"). Ignoring this straightforward
fact has led to a great deal of confusion in the assessment of BITs and their
protection of regulatory takings. This article addresses the question of how a
BIT should approach regulatory takings with the purpose of increasing FDI in
mind. It explores the background of the United States Supreme Court's Penn
Central test and the test's incorporation into the post-NAFTA round of U.S.
BITs. Then, the article examines whether an uncertain and flexible test such as
Penn Central is suitable for treaties that seek to provide foreign investors with
incentives to invest in developing counties.
The article argues that Penn Central is not appropriate for BITs because it does
not provide a clear rule of law that will induce a foreign investor to send its
capital overseas to a developing country. This is partly due to the greater need
for clarity in public law than in private law. For this distinction the article
employs the work of F.A. Hayek and "rules of just conduct" versus "rules of
organization of government." The article also addresses criticisms of the
incentives BITs provide to foreign investors and to host governments and how
those incentives counsel for clear regulatory takings rules. Whatever the merits
there may be for a flexible regulatory takings rule when interpreting the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause, those reasons do not apply to BITs. The article
acknowledges that BITs may not actually succeed in increasing FDI, as the
empirical evidence on the question is mixed. However, if they do, then BITs with
clear regulatory takings standards will be more successful than those with vague
standards, such as Penn Central. Drafters of BITs can still take into account
other objectives such as environmental protection, but should do so with clear
rules of law so foreign investors can plan their investments accordingly.
*Attorney at Law. J.D., University of Minnesota Law School, 2004; M.A., University of
Wisconsin-Madison, 2000; B.A., Hamline University, 1998. The views expressed in this
article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of his present or
former employers or their clients. The author wishes to thank Richard Epstein, Todd J.
Zywicki, and Violeta I. Balan for helpful advice in the drafting of the article. The author
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INTRODUCTION
The Penn Central test, first enunciated in Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City' in 1978, was originally intended to apply to the
Takings Clause of the United States Constitution in regulatory takings cases
in the United States.2 So how does a judicially-crafted land-use test,
originally intended to apply to the United States Constitution, wind up
governing expropriation claims between the citizens of Honduras and Costa
Rica? How does this test grow to become the prevailing mechanism for
settling regulatory takings disputes between multinational corporations and
foreign governments? The answer is: through a compromise intended to
allow for flexibility in investment protection and the protection of U.S.
sovereignty, but resulting in uncertainty and the undermining of a growing
number of foreign treaties.
Penn Central was given a new bill of health in 2002 on two fronts.
The first was the Supreme Court's decision in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.3  There, the Court
reaffirmed the Penn Central test as the "polestar" of a regulatory takings
inquiry and the mechanism by which courts determine whether the
government has committed a regulatory taking.4  Despite some earlier
uncertainty, Tahoe-Sierra cemented the test as central to land-use disputes
under U.S. law. The second front appeared in a less-noticed, but perhaps
wider-reaching, development-a clause in the Bipartisan Trade Promotion
Authority Act of 2002. There, Congress, reacting to criticism of Chapter
11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), directed the
United States Trade Representative ("USTR") to ensure that in future
treaties the United States would give foreign investors no greater rights than
those enjoyed under U.S. law. As the Court had made clear in Tahoe-
Sierra, that meant one thing: use the Penn Central test.8
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
2 Id. at 124.
535 U.S. 302, 336 (2002).
4 Id. (adopting reasoning of Justice O'Connor in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S.
606, 632 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm'n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030-31 (1992) (refusing to apply
the Penn Central test to situations where the government has taken all economic use from a
property owner).
6 See 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(3) (2006).
7 See Mark B. Baker, No Country Left Behind: The Exporting of U.S. Legal Norms Under
the Guise ofEconomic Integration, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 1321, 1338 (2005) (stating that
Congress directed trade agreements to include investment protections at the same level of
protection as those enjoyed under U.S. legal principles); Jesse Williams, Comment,
Regulating Multinational Polluters in a Post-NAFTA Trade Regime: the Lessons of
Metalclad v. Mexico & the Case for a "Takings" Standard, 8 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN
AFF. 473, 475 (2004) (stating that Senators Baucus and Grassley sponsored the amendment
to the Act, limiting the scope of investor protection in future trade deals).
8 See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
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And use it the USTR did.9 This article recounts the story of Penn
Central's creation and the journey of the constitutional test from the Fifth
Amendment to the four corners of the globe via increasingly-popular
BITs.10 These treaties protect foreign investors from a host government's
efforts to expropriate property without compensation.I Since the first BIT
was signed in 1959, BITs have grown phenomenally, with nearly 2,200
BITs signed worldwide through the year 2002.12 The commentary on BITs
has been as caustic as it has been voluminous in recent years, with no
shortage of explanation, denunciation, and pontification on their vices,
virtues, and effectiveness, particularly as concerns NAFTA's Chapter 11.13
Many commentators see threats to sovereignty, impingements on
environmental protection, and even a shadowy international "Lochnerism"
in BITs. 14
What is sometimes lost in the BIT debate is what BITs are actuallyfor.
The obvious-and correct-answer is that countries sign them to increase
or secure FDI.15 Developing countries want to promote FDI because they
9 See infra Part III.C.1.
10 NAFTA's Chapter 11 was merely one of the most prominent BITs. As explained
infra, NAFTA is neither bilateral nor purely an investment treaty, but nevertheless is
correctly labeled a "BIT" for the purposes of this article.
11 See Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jennifer Tobin, Foreign Direct Investment and the
Business Environment in Developing Countries: The Impact ofBilateral Investment Treaties
3 (Yale Law and Econ. Research Paper No. 293, 2005), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=557121 (describing how BITs "bind the
host country to treat all foreign investors from the home country in ways that will protect
their investments and that give them either parity with or advantages over domestic
investors").
12 See Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An
Evaluation ofBilateral Investment Treaties & Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 67,
67-68 (2005).
13 Compare Vicki Been & Joel Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA's
Investment Protections & the Misguided Quest for an International "Regulatory Takings"
Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 30, 39 (2003) (arguing that if NAFTA "becomes more
expansive than U.S. takings law, there will be significant costs"), and Williams, supra note
7, at 502 (characterizing the current trade regime as one "that accords multinational
corporations safe harbor from reasonable environmental policy"), with Amy K. Anderson,
Individual Rights & Investor Protections in a Trade Regime: NAFTA & CAFTA, 63 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1057, 1073-74 (2006) (arguing that the criticisms of NAFTA's Chapter 11
are overblown considering the relatively few number of arbitral awards limiting
governments' regulatory power).
14 See, e.g., Steve Louthan, Note, A Brave New Lochner Era? The Constitutionality of
NAFTA Chapter 11, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1443, 1445 (2001) (stating that NAFTA's
Chapter 11 is "the most significant evisceration of state police power since the Supreme
Court freed the states from Lochner's shackles in 1937").
15 See Deborah L. Swenson, Why Do Developing Countries Sign BITs?, 12 U.C. DAVIS J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 131, 154-55 (2005) (exploring what BITs are for, and concluding that they
do promote foreign investment to a significant degree, and that they are, after all, signed in
order to promote foreign investment).
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determine that the increased investment will assist in a country's economic
growth.' 6 Meanwhile, developed countries want to protect their citizens'
investments located in other countries.17 Therefore, from either point of
view, a BIT is successful if it protects FDI.
This relatively simple principle is often obscured through the raging
debate over the limits that BITs may present to a host country's
sovereignty. Much of the scholarship over BITs centers on the extent to
which BITs protect against regulatory takings.' 8 In short, regulatory takings
are the loss of property through governmental actions short of the outright
confiscation of physical possession or title.'9 Some scholars excoriate BITs
that protect against regulatory takings because those BITs curtail the ability
of sovereign governments to regulate perceived threats to the environment
and public health and safety.20 On the other hand, some recent treatments of
BITs play down this danger and argue that the new U.S. Model BIT (Model
BIT), which includes the Penn Central test, properly finds a middle ground
between the interests of investors and sovereign governments. 21 These
latter scholars approve of a "balanced" approach where BITs allow for a
weighing of the regulatory needs of a host government against the
1 Id. at 131-32 (stating that the benefits of FDI include "increased levels of investment
and economic activity, worker training, [and] well-paid jobs and technology transfers that
enhance the productivity of local firms").
17 There are also, of course, instances of BITs between developed nations and between
developing nations. See Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties
Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?, in THE EFFECTS OF TREATIES
ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION
TREATIES, & INVESTMENT FLOWs 229 (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009) (noting the
recent trend of developing nations signing BITs between themselves). Here the motivations
will be more mixed. An example of the latter is NAFTA's Chapter 11 as it applies to
investment between the United States and Canada. It is interesting to note that as of
February 2006, "all of the NAFTA cases against the United States were filed by Canadian
investors." Gilbert Gagne & Jean-Frederic Morin, The Evolving American Policy on
Investment Protection: Evidence From Recent FTAs and the 2004 Model BIT, 9 J. INT'L
ECON. L. 357, 364 (2006). This illustrates that developed countries do not fear expropriation
claims coming from developing treaty partners.
18 See, e.g., Matthew C. Porterfield, International Expropriation Rules & Federalism, 23
STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 3, 6 (2004) (arguing that increased protections against regulatory takings
are being achieved through NAFTA's Chapter 11); Been & Beauvais, supra note 13, at 141
(arguing that any future BITs should leave out protection for "regulatory takings").
19 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001).
20 See, e.g., Been & Beauvais, supra note 13, at 141 (2003) (arguing that any future BITs
should leave out protection for "regulatory takings").
21 Anderson, supra note 13, at 1073-74 (arguing that the criticisms of NAFTA's Chapter
11 are overblown considering the relatively few number of arbitral awards limiting
governments' regulatory power); see also Marc R. Poirier, The NAFTA Chapter 11
Expropriation Debate Through the Eyes of a Property Theorist, 33 ENVTL. L. 851, 907-08
(2003) (stating that applying the Penn Central test to claims made under BITs "sounds about
right").
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expectations of a foreign investor.22 Arbitral panels are the actors who BITs
direct to perform this balancing, as they are increasingly the method that
23
adjudicates claims between foreign investors and sovereign governments.
What each of these groups misses is that BITs are "investment
treaties." They are not "environmental treaties," "public health and safety
treaties," or even "property rights treaties." They are intended to promote
FDI, not to protect the environment, the public, or any other thing.24 If
governments want to place restrictions on the scope of regulatory takings
protections in BITs they may do so. However, they should provide clear
lines of demarcation for a BIT to successfully provide incentives for greater
FDI. That is, the line between a regulatory taking and a permissible
regulatory action must be as clear as possible. As this article will argue, an
unclear, wavering, multi-faceted test-exactly what the Penn Central test
is-leaves too much uncertainty in what is already a very uncertain
decision: an investor sinking capital into a country whose regulatory
environment and investment protections may be unfamiliar and unfriendly.
This article begins in Part I with a brief survey of BITs. This includes
a discussion of what constitutes a BIT-a surprisingly tricky question-and
what BITs are for. Part II leaves the international scene and recounts the
genesis of the Penn Central decision and its famous test. Part III examines
the fallout from arbitral decisions under NAFTA's Chapter 11, and how the
new Model BIT came to be, including its use of the Penn Central test. Part
IV examines whether the Penn Central test actually does promote FDI, first
looking at the mixed empirical evidence surrounding BITs and investment
in general and then turning in detail to asserted justifications for the use of
Penn Central in BITs. Finally, the discussion examines the trade-offs
governments make in allowing for greater protection against regulatory
takings in BITs, and how to set those protections against the desire to
regulate when promoting FDI is an objective.
Whatever the reasons for the Penn Central test under the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, those reasons do not transfer to supporting
its use in the much more limited context of a BIT. Much of this is
explained by the distinction between public and private law and the
differing need for clear rules of law in each area. This article argues that
public law, such as regulatory takings law, demands clearer rules than does
private law. For this distinction the article turns to the work of F.A. Hayek
and his distinction between "rules of just conduct" and "rules of
organization of government."2 5 Private law answers the question of "what
22 See Poirier, supra note 21.
23 See Rose-Ackerman & Tobin, supra note 11, at 3 ("The most important change [in the
development of BITs] was treaty provisions that transferred some investor-host country
disputes from local courts to international arbitration.").
24 See infra notes 40-53 and accompanying text.
25 See infra Part IV.C.1.
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is property?" whereas public law answers the question of whether that
property has been taken. Whatever the merits of using flexible principles in
answering the first question, those reasons do not extend to using flexible
principles in answering the second question. This is especially true when
the goal of the public law at issue is to provide incentives for people to
invest. Such is the case with a BIT.
One point that the reader is advised to remember throughout this
article is that the author is more than willing to concede that BITs may well
not be effective in promoting FDI. Indeed, the empirical evidence on the
question seems inconclusive. If BITs are effective, however, it is the thesis
of this article that they should supply a clear rule on regulatory takings,
providing potential foreign investors with greater certainty. It is not
necessarily that investors look for stronger regulatory takings protections,
but that they look for more certain protections that they can then use in
planning their investments.
Whether Penn Central belongs in BITs is not just a question for U.S.
policymakers. The test has been incorporated into the Dominican Republic
Central American Free Trade Agreement ("CAFTA"), meaning seven
different countries now will adjudicate international regulatory takings
expropriation claims involving each other via the Penn Central rubric.
Furthermore, Canada's Model BIT now incorporates the Penn Central test,
and therefore "in its future BIT negotiations, the Canadian government will
paradoxically promote criteria unknown in Canadian law." 26 The test is
increasingly popular, perhaps precisely because no one knows what it
actually means.
Even so, U.S. policy will lead the way on this question. With the
passage of the Bush Administration-the Administration whose USTR,
with the prodding of Congress, placed the Penn Central test in the Model
BIT-and the likely slow-down in free trade agreements that the Obama
Administration brings, international scholars should pause and consider
whether we need to rethink our approach to international investment
protection. This reconsideration should start with the first principle of what
are the incentives that promote investment. With that in focus a proper
balancing of economic growth and other interests, with incentives in mind,
can begin.
I. WHAT ARE BITS AND WHY ARE THEY HERE?
The briefest of definitions of a BIT is that it is an agreement between
two countries where each country agrees to grant investors from the other
certain protections to their investments in the foreign country.27 As will be
26 Gagne & Morin, supra note 17, at 371.
27 See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 12, at 67 (The BIT is "an international legal
instrument through which two countries set down rules that will govern investments by their
respective nationals in the other's territory.").
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seen below, this definition is exceedingly narrow, but its core-granting
investors of the other certain investment protections-is common to any
BIT. An increasingly popular additional requirement is that each country
precommit to binding arbitration in the case of a dispute between a foreign
28investor and a signatory country. If a country, often including political
subdivisions of a country, 29 expropriates an investment of a foreign
investor, then that investor may bring a claim before an arbitral panel to
whose jurisdiction the host country, through the BIT, has submitted.30 The
investor may bring the claim without the consent of its home country and
often may do so regardless of whether a domestic investor could obtain
such compensation in the host country's domestic court system.3 1  This
system of investor protection is, unsurprisingly, instituted in order to
increase investment in a host country's economy and to increase the
32investment opportunities of a home country's citizens.
Beyond this basic outline, just what exactly is a BIT is a complicated
question. Chapter 11 of NAFTA, for example, is an investor protection
provision within a wider trade agreement between three different
countries.3 3 It therefore is not "bilateral," nor is it strictly an "investment
treaty." The investment provisions of CAFTA are another example, this
time encompassing seven states.34 Some BITs, moreover, are not as explicit
as others in the ability of investors to force host countries to submit to
binding arbitration. Sometimes the arbitration provisions are explicit,
sometimes open to question, and sometimes aspirational. Accordingly,
28 Rose-Ackerman & Tobin, supra note 11, at 8 (stating that arbitration provisions are
"essential in giving the treaties real bite").
29 Porterfield, supra note 18, at 7 (describing how state and local governments may
violate the protections of NAFTA's Chapter 11).
30 See Michael G. Parisi, Moving Toward Transparency? An Examination of Regulatory
Takings in International Law, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 383, 399-400 (2005) (explaining the
arbitral process).
31 Neumayer & Spess, supra note 17, at 230 ("Often, foreign investors are not required to
first exhaust domestic legal remedies and can thus bypass or avoid national legal systems,
reaching straight for international arbitration.").
32 Rose-Ackerman & Tobin, supra note 11, at 3 (noting the reasons that each type of
country enters into a BIT).
3 See generally North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., ch. 11, Dec.
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
34 These countries are Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua, and the United States. See Dominican Republic-Central American
Free Trade Agreement, Costa Rica-Dom. Rep.-El Sal.-Guat.-Hond.-Nicar.-U.S., Preamble,
Aug. 5, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 514 (2004), available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-
trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/final-text [hereinafter
CAFTA]. Costa Rica only fully implemented the treaty in November, 2008. See
International Briefing, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 12, 2008.
35 Jason Webb Yackee, Conceptual Difficulties in the Empirical Study of Bilateral
Investment Treaties, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 405, 421-22 (2008) (stating that different BITs
have different levels of commitment to arbitration).
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BITs vary widely in the strength of their procedural protections.
Additionally, BITs are the descendants of "Friendship, Navigation and
Commerce" Treaties ("FNCs") that gave some, but not all, of the same
protections. Although private parties could not usually bring claims against
sovereign governments under FNCs, the treaties provided a commitment to
protection of cross-border investment and expressed the signatory
countries' commitment to the security of private property.
For the purposes of this article, BIT shall refer broadly to all
investment protection treaties, including treaties with wider application,
such as bilateral free trade agreements ("FTAs"), and multilateral treaties,
such as NAFTA and CAFTA. It will not, however, refer to FNCs unless an
FNC allows for private investors to bring a claim directly against a host
government. The right to bring a claim without permission from one's
home government-or more simply to bring a claim at all-is what
separates BITs from most other enforcement mechanisms in international
law. It removes the choice of whether or not to pursue a legal remedy out
of the political realm (where it would lie if the decision on whether to
prosecute a claim rested with the home government)37 and into the
economic arena.38 This is what is most distinctive and new about BITs and
what gives them force in today's globalization debate.
Additionally, in this article "BIT" will not include other possible legal
arrangements where investors protect themselves against possible
expropriation, or where host countries seek to increase FDI. These include
contracts made directly between a foreign investor and a host government,
insurance policies purchased in case of expropriation, and tax incentives
36 Daniel M. Price, Investment, Sovereignty, & Justice: Arbitration Under NAFTA
Chapter Eleven: Some Observations on Chapter Eleven of NAFTA, 23 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 421, 426-27 (2000) (describing background of FNCs).
3 Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International
Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner & Yoo, 92 CAL. L. REv. 899, 936 (2005)
(arguing that when private parties actually can bring their own claims before "supranational
tribunals" "no 'political filter' exists to screen out cases that are legally meritorious but
diplomatically or politically embarrassing"). Examples of tribunals where only governments
may bring claims include the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization, and
the United Nation's International Court of Justice. See Ernest A. Young, Institutional
Settlement in a Globalizing Judicial System, 54 DUKE L.J. 1143, 1213 (2005). These two
examples also point out the difference between binding jurisdiction (the WTO) and
jurisdiction through consent (the ICJ). As stated above, one strength of BITs is that they
generally precommit a signatory to the jurisdiction of an arbitral panel. See Rose-Ackerman
& Tobin, supra note 11.
38 Another example is, in a limited geographic and often non-economic context, the
European Court of Human Rights, where an individual can bring a claim against a signatory
government. See Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 294 (1997) (noting the crucial importance
of having a private right of action against European governments in the European Court of
Human Rights).
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granted to companies that engage in FDI.3 9 The instant question is how
BITs may be written so as to better promote FDI, not how FDI itself can be
better procured through whatever means. As stated above, it may well be
that BITs are a poor method of inducing more FDI. Tax incentives or
private contracts, for instance, may be preferable. However, once a country
has chosen a BIT as a method to increase FDI, some types of BITs would
be more successful than others in promoting FDL
Along with the question of what is a BIT comes the question of what is
a BIT for? As discussed above, the answer is obvious. However, the
answer is also revealing. Again, it is generallZ held that developing
countries enter into BITs in order to increase FDI. They may have other
reasons, such as cosmetically symbolizing a strong relationship between
two countries, pleasing the wishes of a developed country in order to win
more foreign aid, or impressing a rival developing country.4 1 However,
increased FDI is the prime objective. For developed countries, the reasons
for entering into BITs are to protect the foreign investments of domestic
42investors, as well as to expand their investment opportunities.
Admittedly, while a mercantilist developed country might not necessarily
be enthused about its citizens investing their capital abroad, once that
capital is invested elsewhere the country may become worried about how
43secure the investments are.
39 Cf Been & Beauvais, supra note 13, at 109-16 (discussing the use of government-
sponsored and private insurance schemes for host country expropriation of FDI).
40 See, e.g., Parisi, supra note 30, at 399 ("BITs are signed between host States and the
investor's home State specifically to protect private foreign direct investment."); Salacuse &
Sullivan, supra note 12, at 77 ("[D]eveloping countries sign BITs to promote foreign
investment, thereby increasing the amount of capital and associated technology that flows to
their territories." (emphasis in original)); Victor Mosoti, Bilateral Investment Treaties & the
Possibility of a Multilateral Framework on Investment at the WTO: Are Poor Economies
Caught in Between?, 26 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 95, 97 (2005) (describing how developing
countries "abide by the prevailing orthodoxy that FDI is a major pre-condition for their
economic advancement" and enter into BITs to attract FDI); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief
History ofInternational Investment Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 157, 171,
178-79 (2005) ("[T]he motivation for the developing county to conclude the agreements in
most cases was to attract foreign investment.").
41 Note, though, that if a developing country enters into a BIT because it fears more FDI
is going to a rival country, then the BIT is not entered into for mere vanity purposes, but also
for FDI.
42 See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 12, at 76 (naming the protection of investments
and the facilitation of the entry of additional investments as the reasons for developed
countries to enter into BITs).
43 See Gagne & Morin, supra note 17, at 372. These incentives do not exactly apply to
BITs between developed countries. There, each country is apparently willing to trade
protection of its citizens' investments with increased risk of an expropriation claim made by
the citizens of the other country. Id. Although, this is not always true, and is sometimes
mitigated against. It is telling that the investment protections in the recent FTA between the
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The claim that developing countries enter into BITs to promote FDI is
quite uncontroversial. After all, they are "investment treaties," not
"property rights" treaties, "labor relations" treaties, or "security" treaties.
Both friends and foes of the increasing use of BITs conclude that their
purpose is to increase FDI." They should not be faulted for concluding as
much. A moment's reflection demonstrates that there are other possible
reasons for why BITs are entered into, but a moment's more illustrates why
they are not the actual reasons.
BITs extend to foreign investors elements of what U.S. jurisprudence
recognizes as due process, equal protection, and just compensation.45 It is
plausible that countries would enter into BITs because their governments
wished to extend those principles to their own citizens when abroad. In that
case, countries would enter into BITs to secure protection for their own
citizens in other countries in exchange for protecting those countries'
citizens. However, if this were the case, the treaties would cover "persons,"
not just "investors," and would perhaps include more substantive rights than
merely "just compensation." It might be argued that other substantive
rights are covered in other treaties, such as the U.N. Universal Declaration
on Human Rights and the Helsinki Accords, and that BITs are merely made
to supplement these protections. However, those documents are not on2,
directed toward protecting foreign citizens, but also domestic persons.
Thus, if a "global Fifth Amendment," similar to the Universal Declaration,
were entered into by developing countries it might be done for reasons
other than increasing FDI. However, a BIT is a different story because it
only protects foreigners.
Countries might also enter into BITs for symbolic reasons. This would
be akin to the "Friendship" portion of the old treaties of "Friendship,
Navigation, and Commerce." The argument might be that whatever fluff is
included in a BIT is merely a way for nations to demonstrate that they think
investing in each other's economies is important. However, this would not
explain the presence of binding arbitration provisions. A treaty is not
entirely symbolic if an enforcement mechanism can result in the loss of
millions of dollars.47  Arbitration provisions binding countries to a
tribunal's jurisdiction are not aspirational, unlike, arguably, "optional
jurisdiction" international tribunals such as the International Court of
4See, e.g., Been & Beauvais, supra note 13, at 117-18 (discussing how developing
governments seek to increase FDI).
45 Id at 40-41 (analogizing various BIT clauses to clauses in the U.S. Constitution).
46 In other words, Mexico does not violate NAFTA's Chapter 11 by expropriating
property from Mexican citizens. It would violate the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights, however, by imprisoning its own citizens without trial. See Universal Declaration on
Human Rights, art. 11(1).
47 For example, the NAFTA Metalclad arbitral panel originally awarded $16,685,000.00,
all of which was to be paid by the Mexican government. See Metalclad Corp. v. United
Mexican States, Award, 40 I.L.M. 36, 54 (NAFTA ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Aug. 30, 2000).
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Justice.48 States can, and do, lose in arbitration and yet they continue to
enter into BITs. A country that merely wished to affirm its friendship with
another would be much better advised to sign a declaration stating as much,
or a substantive treaty that imposes obligations but is not directly
enforceable.
In this way, the reason why countries enter into BITs is similar to the
reason why they join the World Trade Organization ("WTO"). In either
case they do so even though the treaty subjects governments to the
jurisdiction of a tribunal whose judgments are binding.4 9 Countries may
enter the WTO in order to join the "community of nations," but it is a high
price to pay if the country does not also wish to lower its barriers to
imports. Further, even if some countries do enter the WTO merely because
they wish to express their alliance with other members, the case is much
weaker for BITs because they are much less visible than the WTO.
Additionally, BITs are not a "community" but a monadic series of
agreements.
Readers are free to hypothesize additional reasons why developing
countries enter into BITs, but all other reasons will fail to match the
straightforward reason of "to increase FDI." In response a reader might cite
literature that argues that many developing countries do not want to sign
BITs, but do so in an arms race with other developing countries, feeling that
if they do not they will be left behind.50 However, this only further proves
that increasing FDI is the root reason for this behavior, however detrimental
it may be." This view merely illustrates that developing countries sign
agreements because they want FDI so badly they will sacrifice other goods
to procure it.
Thus, throughout the rest of this article it is a central assumption that
developing countries enter into BITs in order to increase FDI. It is
therefore a truism that BITs which actually do increase FDI are successful.
BITs that do not, and merely express friendship between nations, are at best
paper tigers and at worst failures.
Given its obviousness, this conclusion might seem much ado about
48 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36.
49 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Uruguay Round Agreement,
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, arts. 21-22.
50 One proponent of this view is Professor Andrew Guzman. He submits that an
individual developing country is better off granting concessions, such as those found in
BITs, to foreign investors, but that developing countries as a whole would be better off
"forcing investors to enter contracts with host countries that cannot be enforced in an
international forum." Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them:
Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 643
(1998).
s This discussion does not mean to impute proponents of this "arms race" hypothesis
with the view that developing countries do not sign BITs to increase FDI, but merely to
analyze such a view.
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nothing. However, keeping it in the forefront of one's mind is something
missing from much of the work on BITs and regulatory takings. BITs are
attacked for a myriad of reasons,5 2 but the question of how BIT
expropriation provisions can best facilitate and incentivize FDI is
infrequently asked in the legal literature. Instead, scholars criticize
expropriation provisions on the grounds that they allow attacks on a state's
ability to protect the environment or that they infringe on a nation's
sovereignty. When the underlying reason for a BIT is not kept in mind
these criticisms turn BITs into nothing more than heavy-handed impositions
of U.S. property rights. This is because BITs do not make sense unmoored
from the goal of increasing FDI. Instead, they seem like an "economic
charter of rights," akin to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
except that they, bizarrely, only protect foreigners.
II. THE ORIGINS OF PENN CENTRAL'S VAGUENESS
One way in which a BIT might fail in its purpose of increasing FDI is
by providing vague standards for what constitutes an expropriation. For an
investor, the vaguer the standard the less certain she can be as to whether or
not she will receive compensation if a host government diminishes the
value of her investment through regulation. One such vague standard is the
Penn Central test. For background on the test it is necessary to leave
international law for a moment and turn to the test's origins in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York.5 4 Following this review, this
article will examine the United States' recent history with BITs, particularly
that involving NAFTA, and will follow with how Penn Central became a
part of the current Model BIT and how it may undermine the purpose of
increasing FDI.
In the late 1960s the Penn Central railroad was running at a loss.5
Unlike most other businesses that suffer from repeated annual deficits, Penn
Central could not simply close its doors and walk away. As a "common
carrier," the Penn Central owed the public a duty to operate and had to keep
running its trains. Therefore, it needed to find an influx of cash short of
selling its trains at auction. It found such an opportunity in expanding the
size of its prized Penn Central Station in midtown Manhattan. This would
involve utilizing the airspace rights to the space above the existing Grand
Terminal building to build new offices. The original plan for the building
52 See, e.g., Williams, supra note 7, at 473 (discussing lack of accounting for democratic
will in NAFTA's Chapter 11).
5 See, e.g., id.
54 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
5 See Gideon Kanner, Making Laws & Sausages: A Quarter-Century Retrospective on
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 653,
713 (2005) (describing annual deficits in excess of one million dollars).
56 See id. (explaining why the company could not cease to operate).
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had envisioned adding stories to its height, so the idea was inarguably in
keeping with its original design.57 The railroad hoped to turn a profit with
the funds derived from leasing the new office space.
The only problem was that expanding the height of the station would
run afoul of the historic designation that the City's Landmarks Preservation
Commission had bestowed on the building. The designation was pursuant
to New York's city-wide historical preservation scheme, in which the
Commission listed certain buildings and would only allow modifications to
those buildings under special circumstances.59 The railroad applied for a60
variance on two separate occasions, but the City denied both attempts.
Lacking a variance, the railroad sued, claiming that in denying the building61
addition the City had committed a regulatory taking.
After victory in the trial court, but losses in the Appellate Division and
New York Court of Appeals, Penn Central appealed to the United States
Supreme Court.62 There, the railroad focused the issue on the loss of its air
rights, not so much its operating deficit, arguing that in denying it
permission to build additional stories the City had taken its roperty." The
Court, by a 6-3 margin, rejected Penn Central's argument. In so doing,
the Court manufactured a multi-factored test to determine when a regulatory
taking occurs and concluded that Penn Central failed the test.6' The Court
enunciated that regulatory takings cases were "essentially ad hoc, factual
inquiries."6 6 In making these "factual inquiries" it averred that three factors
"have particular significance."67 These were "the economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant . . . the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations" and "the character
5 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 115-16. The original plan intended twenty stories, and the
plan at issue in Penn Central was for fifty-five. Id. The Supreme Court stated that Penn
Central might have a chance to go back to the City and merely ask for a twenty-story
addition. Id. However, the facts were such that approval of even this much more modest
proposal was highly unlikely. Id.
5 8 id
5 See id at 112 (detailing exemptions application process).
6 Id at 116-17.
61 Id. at 119.
62 Id. at 122.
63 Id. at 130. Penn Central chose not to focus on the fact that it was hemorrhaging money
and that the addition of office space was the only way it could turn the business around. Id
The reasons for this strategy, not entirely relevant to the present discussion, were because of
the peculiar opinion of the New York Court of Appeals. For a detailed discussion see
Kanner, supra note 55, at 722-37 (discussing the opinion of the Court of Appeals, and its
rather unique reliance on the views of nineteenth century political philosopher Henry
George).
6 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 138.
6s Id. at 124-38.
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of the governmental action."
Faced with these factors-never before enumerated together in a
Supreme Court opinion-the Court concluded that the equities were not in
Penn Central's favor.69  The economic impact of the regulation was
mitigated by the option to transfer the Terminal's air rights to other parcels
nearby.70 The "investment-backed expectations" had been met, in spite of
the Landmarks Law, because the railroad could still use the Terminal
"precisely as it has been used for the past 65 years: as a railroad terminal
containing office space and concessions."7 1 Therefore, "the law does not
interfere with what must be regarded as Penn Central's primary expectation
concerning the use of the parcel."7 2  Finally, the "character" of the
governmental action was "a comprehensive plan" that benefited "the quality
of life in the city as a whole," including the owners of the terminal
themselves.73 In sum, the Landmarks Law did not prevent the railroad from
doing what it had been doing all along, did so in a way that it was not
"singled out" so that it bore "public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the people as a whole," 74 and was left with a
method to mitigate its damages.
Although this method of "calculating" whether a regulatory taking has
occurred has been roundly reviled, the Court could be commended for at
least setting forth a path for tackling the question. It gave some substance
to Justice Holmes' question-raising explanation that a regulation will be
recognized as a taking if it "goes too far" in regulating property.75 That
being said, the test itself had a somewhat mysterious genealogy.
As Giddeon Kanner and others have illustrated, the three-pronged test
was largely influenced by Professor Frank Michelman's 1967 Harvard Law
Review article Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law.76  Michelman explored what
68 Id. The Court also explained that "[a] 'taking' may more readily be found when the
interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than
when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of
economic life to promote the common good." Id. This largely became a moot point in
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), when the Court ruled
that permanent physical invasions are per se takings.
69 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 138.
70 Id. at 137.
71 Id. at 136.
72 Id at 134-35.
n The Court did concede that the owners may have been "more burdened than benefited
by the law," but stated that was also the case with the owners in prior cases upholding zoning
legislation. Id at 135.
1 Id at 123.
7 Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) ("The general rule at least is that
while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking.").
76 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 128 (citing Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and
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divided compensable takings from noncompensable police power actions.
After conceding that reconciling the inconsistent case law seemed to be a
hopeless task, he reviewed the issue from various normative perspectives,
and concluded that the only standard that could consistently be applied was
that a landowner should be compensated if doing so would be "fair." 77 He
explored utilitarian reasons for compensation of "takings," as well as the
more nuanced views of John Rawls, and discerned that a property owner
would be more deserving of compensation if he had "some distinctly
perceived, sharply crystallized, investment-backed expectation." 78 Another
reason, from utilitarian grounds, might be the stress that a property owner
could sustain once he learned of the offending regulation.79
Now, Michelman did not explicitly endorse the utilitarian approach to
regulatory takings,80 but he did take away from that approach the value of
turning to "investment-backed expectations" in resolving regulatory takings
disputes. That criterion su ested a manner of deciding when a police
power action "goes too far.' The case law was so jumbled on the issue
that anything beyond a "fairness" standard either left deserving landowners
uncompensated or provided a windfall to landowners who were merely
affected by activities better described as garden-variety police power
actions. Further, not only was it a way to explain the case law, but it was
the only method that could meet the objections to other possible standards.
The physical takings dividing line, for example, did not work for two
reasons. First, because some physical takings are de minimis intrusions
onto a few feet of a landowner's property causing no consternation on the
part of the landowner and perhaps a large benefit on the part of the public.
Second, some regulations provide little benefit to the public with huge costs
on the few landowners that the regulations affect.82
With Michelman's scholarship at his disposal, Justice Brennan added
some of the Court's patchwork of precedents and weaved the confused field
together into the Penn Central test.83 To summarize, the test allows courts
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L.
REv. 1165 (1967)).
77 See Michelman, supra note 76, at 1221 (stating that "[w]hat we want to know, then, is
whether a specific decision not to compensate is fair").
78 Id. at 1233.
7 Id at 1234 ("[T]he 'balancing' test is relevantly aimed at discovering not whether a
measure is or is not efficient, but whether it is so obviously efficient as to quiet the potential
outrage of persons 'unavoidably' sacrificed in its interest.").
80 Id. at 1218-19 ("It is not the purpose of this essay to make a case for utilitarian
ethics.. . . there is no basis for concluding that the question of compensability is intelligible
only when compensation is regarded as an instrument of utilitarian maximizing.").
81 See id at 1241 (arguing that declarations prohibiting use of all lands in order to
preempt natural resource exploitation may have an adverse affect on productivity, but not
when limited to a specific use or portion of the land).
82 See id. at 1184-90 (discussing physical invasion criterion).
83 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 128 (1978). The use of
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to review a case's entire record ("ad hoc factual inquiries") for whether the
regulation at issue falls on the "fair" or "unfair" side of the ledger. 84 Courts
can look at the economic impact of the regulation, but can also consider
other factors.85  They are also free to examine the "character" of the
regulation, and-as long as it is not a8Vhysical taking--can also specify the
"character" as compensable or not. Furthermore, they can look for
"investment backed expectations" and divine whether the investors
expected certain returns or not. In short, courts are free to range just about
as widely as they please in determining whether the government has taken
property without providing just compensation.
Criticism of the Penn Central approach has been vociferous." Much
Michelman's work is commented on in the following: "It has been believed-correctly, as it
turns out-by specialized land-use lawyers deeply involved in this subject, that this phrase
was inserted into the Penn Central opinion by Justice Brennan's clerk who consulted
Professor Michelman's prestigious article." Kanner, supra note 55, at 770.
84 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
85 Id
86 id
87 Id. at 124, 127. What those "expectations" are is a sticky wicket. In the case of the
Penn Central railroad, for example, was it the expectations of the original investors or the
current investors that was at issue? After all, the original ones had presumably long since
left the picture. And if it was the original ones, were the expectations only those that the
railroad actualized soon-after the station began operating (the running of the railway), or
those that could have been implemented but were delayed to an indefinite point in time?
Would this have been different had the fifty five extra stories been applied for in 1923, only
a few years after the station's completion? Or in 1933? Or one year before the Landmark
Law went into effect? All of these questions are material, especially considering that the
Supreme Court has since allowed regulatory takings claims even when the regulation was
instituted before the current owner obtained the property. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630 (2001) (allowing takings claim to proceed even though claimant
purchased property after challenged regulation was instituted).
88 Instead of reviewing what has been reviewed before in countless law journals, here is
an overview of the virile dislike of the opinion from some of its few friends:
It does not do justice to academic criticism of Penn Central to describe such
criticism as a cottage industry. It is more like an industrial revolution. More than
two decades ago, Carol Rose characterized regulatory takings law as a "muddle,"
and that characterization has acquired the status of conventional wisdom. Attacks
on Penn Central, from every possible direction, would fill several very long
footnotes. Many of the criticisms of modern doctrine are substantive, urging either
that the Court has overstated or understated the extent to which regulations should
be regarded as takings. We do not deal with those substantive issues in this article.
For our purposes, we take the underlying substantive law, as it presently stands, as
given and focus on Penn Central as a doctrinal tool. From that perspective, the
criticisms of Penn Central that are relevant to our project are jurisprudential
criticisms, of which there are plenty.
Gary Lawson, Katharine Ferguson & Guillermo A. Montero, "Oh Lord, Please Don 't Let
Me Be Misunderstood!": Rediscovering the Mathews v. Eldridge & Penn Central
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of this has gone to the vagueness and malleableness of the test and the
unpredictability that the test invites. Some theorists, however, have
defended Penn Central's vagueness approach. The defense basically
concludes that, after all, the test is a good approximation of what is "fair."
One such defender is Professor Marc. R. Poirier. 89 Rather than insisting
that Penn Central actually gives clear guidance as to what is a regulatory
taking, Professor Poirier carefully and painstakingly argues that Penn
Central indeed is vague, but that its vagueness is what makes the test more
fair.90 His analysis is reviewed below, after this article examines the use of
the Penn Central test in light of its incorporation into BITs. Poirier's
argument, though seductive, is flawed because it fails to appreciate the
public law nature of takings law. Further, even granting validity to his
argument that vague regulatory takings standards should apply to the Fifth
Amendment, they do not extend to supporting vague standards in BITs. His
view fails to account for the goal of BITs: stability for foreign investors in
inducing them to invest.
Before addressing these arguments, the narrative now turns to how the
Penn Central test became affixed to the United States' latest round of BITs
and what that means for their expropriation protections.
III. RIDING THE PENN CEATRAL: FROM NAFTA TO CAFTA
A. National Treatment Clauses in BITs
The United States' recent BITs have typically offered three basic
pillars of protection to investors: national treatment clauses, minimum
standard of treatment clauses, and expropriation clauses.91 The first is
roughly an equal protection clause for foreign investors. 92 Generally, under
a national treatment clause, a signatory government to a BIT may not treat
an investment differently because it is foreign owned. Because such a
concept is the most obvious way to protect foreign investors and says
nothing about the substance of investor protections themselves, it has
proved less controversial in the implementation of BITs and in the
outcomes of arbitral tribunals.9 4 This level of protection, without anything
Frameworks, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1, 34-35 (2005).
89 See Marc. R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L.
REv. 93 (2002) (arguing that the vagueness in takings doctrine is functional and entirely
appropriate).
90 Id.
91 See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 33 (including all three forms of investor protection).
92 Been & Beauvais, supra note 13, at 40 (describing the purpose of BIT clauses).
93 See Joshua Robbins, The Emergence of Positive Obligations in Bilateral Investment
Treaties, 13 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 403, 421 (2006) (examining how national
treatment clauses operate).
94 See, e.g., Been & Beauvais, supra note 13, at 37 (fiercely criticizing regulatory takings
clauses in BITs, but stating that national treatment clauses can protect against the "most
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more, is essentially that of the Calvo Doctrine, which was influential among
Latin American nations until relatively recently.95 Under the Calvo
Doctrine, a government may expropriate foreign investments without any
compensation at all so long as it treats its own citizens in the same
96
manner.
B. Minimum Standard of Treatment Clauses and Customary International
Law
Of course, allowing governments to expropriate without compensation
would do little to further the interests behind an investor protection treaty.
A foreign investor could care less about equal treatment if all investments-
foreign and domestic-are at risk. Therefore, diplomats have crafted the
substantive protections of minimum standard of treatment clauses and
expropriation clauses. Minimum standard of treatment clauses are more
nebulous than national treatment clauses and have proved hard to interpret.
This is because the standard they often refer to-the minimum standard of
investor protection under international law-is itself nebulous and hard to
interpret. As the Supreme Court itself has said: "[T]here are few if any
issues in international law today on which opinion seems to be so divided as
the limitations on a state's power to expropriate the property of aliens."97
Not only has the minimum standard of protection under international
law proved elusive, but so has the meaning of "international law" itself as
that term is used in U.S. BITs. An example of this controversy is S.D.
Myers, Inc. v. Canada Partial Award" where an arbitral tribunal ruled that
Canada had violated Section 1105-the NAFTA provision enforcing the
minimum standard of treatment under international law-by arbitrarily
banning the importation of the industrial chemicals known as PCPs.99 The
panel had already found that Canada violated Section 1102 (national
treatment) and therefore found that Canada violated Section 1105 because
Section 1102 itself was, after all, part of international law.100
The counter to such a finding is the argument that what the NAFTA
serious risk of overreaching" by governments against foreign investors).
9 Santiago Montt, What International Investment Law & Latin America Can and Should
Demand From Each Other: Updating the Bello/Calvo Doctrine in the BIT Generation, 3
RES. PUBLICA ARGENTINA 75, 105 (2007) (discussing how Latin American countries upheld
the Calvo Doctrine until the recent emergence of BITs).
96 See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agreements,
12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 157, 159 (2005) (describing the Calvo Doctrine).
9 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964); but see Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, Investment Agreements & International Law, 42 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 123,
130 (2003) (arguing that international law is slowly coming to a consensus on expropriation
issues).
98 40 I.L.M. 1408 (NAFTA, ch. 11 Arb. Trib., Nov. 12, 2000).
" Id. at 1439.
100 Id.
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signatories meant in stating "international law" was "customary
international law," and not just anything that might be an aspect of
international law, such as treaties. Under this argument, the drafters could
not have intended to incorporate by reference the various treaties on
investor protection that may give greater rights to investors than customary
international law itself would give.' 0 In fact, following the S.D. Myers
award, the NAFTA parties issued Notes of Interpretation stating that that
indeed was the case. 2 This view lead to the following language in the new
Model BIT, drafted following the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority
Act of 2002: "Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in
accordance with customary international law, including fair and equitable
treatment and full protection and security." 03
As to what this "customary international law" is, Annex A of the
Model BIT states that "[t]he Parties confirm their shared understanding that
'customary international law' generally and as specifically referenced in
Article 5 [Minimum Standard of Treatment] and Annex B [Expropriation]
results from a general and consistent practice of States that they follow
from a sense of legal obligation."'0 There is nothing surprising about this
definition, as this is the textbook answer as to what customary international
law means.'s However, it does remind future arbitral panels that
customary international law does not concern treaties. Therefore, another
treaty's existence, or even another provision of the relevant BIT, cannot be
considered in determining whether a party to the BIT has expropriated an
investment. This hardly clears the field for what the "minimum standard"
is, but it does make clear that BITs themselves do not define the minimum
standard.
C. Expropriation Clauses
Expropriation provisions, the third pillar of BIT protections, are the
most controversial of all. They provide protection above and beyond even
the "minimum standard of treatment" under (customary) international
law. 0 6 They typically state that if a signatory, or constituent government,
101 See, e.g., Alireza Falsafi, The International Minimum Standard of Treatment of
Foreign Investors'Property, 30 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 317, 349 (2007) (explaining
the Myers panel's decision).
102 NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11
Provisions § B (July 31, 2001) (seeking to set the record straight on the intent of the NAFTA
Parties regarding the term "international law").
103 U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY, at art. 5.1 (2004),
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/U.S.%20model%20BIT.pdf (emphasis added).
1 Id. at Annex A.
105 See JANIS NOYES, CASES & COMMENTARY ON INTERNATIONAL LAw 20-24 (3d ed.
2006) (defining "customary international law" by presenting Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)).
106 See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
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expropriates an investment the government must provide some measure of
monetary compensation to the investor. 107  As explained earlier, this
protection is the driving force behind BITs. 08 If a government has a history
of expropriating property without compensation, such as the barrage of
expropriations that occurred in Third World nationalization of industries
during the Cold War, then such a provision provides a level of protection to
a foreign investor who might otherwise choose not to invest in the host
nation. 1 The hope is that such protection will increase FDI.
1. NAFTA and Its Backlash: No Greater Substantive Rights
Expropriation provisions have proved especially controversial in
recent years when arbitral panels have interpreted them to include
regulatory takings. The text of BITs have long provided protection from
regulatory takings, but since the reasons behind BITs are grounded in
historical mass expropriations of physical property, regulatory takings
"clauses" have not been a large concern until recently. This changed with
NAFTA's Chapter 11. Under its terms, arbitral panels have either come
close to or actually found that host governments committed regulatory
takings.110 In Metalclad, for example, the arbitral panel concluded that the
Mexican provincial government committed a regulatory taking in arbitrarily
denying a permit to run a toxic waste site. 11 Given the expansive reading
of the "tantamount to expropriation" language in Article 1110 of NAFTA, it
is very likely that no taking would have been found had the case been
reviewed under U.S. law and the Fifth Amendment.112 This gave rise to
fears that if a similar claim were made against the United States or a state or
local government, the United States would be forced to pay compensation
for actions for which it would not have to pay if the U.S. Constitution were
applied." 3
With this in mind, some U.S. officials wanted to make sure that post-
NAFTA BITs did not subject the United States to arbitral awards if the
107 Carlos M. Correa, Investment Protection in Bilateral & Free Trade Agreements:
Implications for the Granting of Compulsory Licenses, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 331, 348 (2004)
(explaining the purpose of expropriation clauses).
108 See supra Part I.
109 See Vandevelde, supra note 96, at 166-67 (discussing expropriations of foreign
investment by developing countries during the post-colonial cold war period).
1o See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, 38 I.L.M. 708, 730 (NAFTA ch. 11 Arb. Trib. June
24, 1998) (establishing jurisdiction); Metalclad Corp. v. The United Mexican States, 40
I.L.M. 36, 54 (NAFTA ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Aug. 30, 2000); S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, 40
I.L.M. 1408, 1439, Partial Award (NAFTA, ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Nov. 12, 2000); The Loewen
Group v. United States, 42 I.L.M. 811, 812 (NAFTA, ch. 11 Arb. Trib. June 26, 2003).
.. Metalclad, 40 I.L.M. at 54.
112 See generally Williams, supra note 7, at 473 (criticizing the expansiveness of the
Metalclad panel's interpretation of NAFTA's Chapter 11).
113 See id.
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standard for liability was stricter than that under U.S. domestic law. They
believed this would lead to the perverse result of a foreign investor
receiving greater protection than a domestic investor would enjoy.1 14
Indeed, many already believe that U.S. regulatory takings protections are
already too strong and would presumably object to even stronger
protections for foreigners. 5
Thus, in 2002 Congress inserted explicit language into the Bipartisan
Trade Promotion Authority Act, directing U.S. trade negotiators to, inter
alia, "[E]nsur[e] that foreign investors in the United States are not accorded
greater substantive rights with respect to investment protections than United
States investors in the United States."' 16 With this direction, post-NAFTA
BITs (variants of the new Model BIT) have included significantly altered
language in their expropriation clauses. 17
The new Model BIT's investor protection language differs from
NAFTA's in a significant but roundabout way. The expropriation section
itself, Article 10.7, contains a very slight change. NAFTA's section 1110
begins:
No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an
investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a
measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an
investment ("expropriation"), except: (a) for a public purpose; (b) on
a nondiscriminatory basis; (c) in accordance with due process of law
and Article 1105(1); and (d) on payment of compensation in
accordance with paragraphs 2 through 6.
In contrast, the Model BIT's Article 6.1 begins:
Neither Party may expropriate or nationalize a covered investment
either directly or indirectly through measures equivalent to
expropriation or nationalization ("expropriation"), except: (a) for a
public purpose; (b) in a non-discriminatory manner; (c) on payment
114 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(3) (2006).
115 See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings
Doctrine, 22 ECOLOGY L. Q. 89 (1995) (advocating a less expansive reading of the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause).
116 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(3) (2006).
117 See United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, art. 10, annex 10-D June
6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026 (2004), available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-
trade-agreements/chile-fta/fmal-text (applying Penn Central language to regulatory takings
claims); United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, Side Letter Exchange on
Expropriation (May 6, 2003), available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/singapore-fta/final-text (follow hyperlink entitled "Exchange of Letters on Land
Expropriation") (also applying Penn Central language to regulatory takings claims);
CAFTA, supra note 34 at art. 10, annex 10-C (also applying Penn Central language to
regulatory takings claims).
118 NAFTA, supra note 33, at art. 1110 (emphasis added).
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of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation; and (d) in
accordance with due process of law and Article 5 [Minimum
Standard of Treatment](1) through (3).' 9
Notice the only significant change is that "measures equivalent to
expropriation" replaces "a measure tantamount to [expropriation]." If
"equivalent to expropriation" were identical in meaning to "tantamount to
expropriation," then there would be no substantive change between the two
texts. Some commentators expressed alarm after the signing of NAFTA,
worrying that arbitral panels would interpret "tantamount" expansively to
mean something much less than "expropriation."l 20 However, those panels
that have discussed the subject have read "tantamount" in NAFTA's
Chapter 11 to mean "equivalent."l 21 Thus, although "tantamount" has been
a cause for great concern, and although arbitral panels might still read it
expansively, those concerns have not yet been realized. To quell these
fears, however, NAFTA's "tantamount" language has been replaced by
"equivalent" in the new Model BIT.
2. The Definition of "Investment"
To find the unarguably substantive changes in expropriation protection
between NAFTA and the Model BIT, one must look to the definition of
"investment," and to the model treaty's Annexes. First of all, the Model
BIT defines what an "investment" is (that is, what is protected from a host
government's expropriation).122 Surprisingly, considering the concern over
the expansive form of NAFTA's takings provisions, the Model BIT's
definition of investment is arguably more expansive than that in NAFTA.123
Its scope includes the following forms: "an enterprise," "equity
participation," bonds and loans, derivatives, investment contracts,
intellectual property rights, and some forms of licenses and permits.124
Finally, it includes a catch-all clause including "other tangible or intangible,
movable or immovable property, and related property rights, such as leases,
mortgages, liens, and pledges."125
119 U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY, supra note 103, at art. 6.1 (emphasis
added).
120 Ian A. Laird, NAFTA Chapter 11: NAFTA Chapter 11 Meets Chicken Little, 2 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 223, 226-27 (2001) (explaining the various positions on the meaning of
"tantamount to expropriation").
121 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Interim Award, para. 104 (NAFTA, ch. 11 Arb. Trib.,
June 26, 2000); S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award, 40 I.L.M. 1408, 1440 (NAFTA,
ch. 11 Arb. Trib., Nov. 12, 2000).
122 See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
123 See Letter of Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) (Feb. 27, 2003)
available at http://www.ciel.org/Publications/TEPAC-Agreements-27Feb03.pdf (presenting
concerns of scholars regarding the definition of "investment").
124 U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY, supra note 103, at art. 1.
125 Id.
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Note that "investment" includes not only "enterprises," equities,
traditional investment contracts, and real property, but also "other tangible
or intangible, movable or immovable property, and related property
rights."' 2  This might include the "taking" of one use of a piece of property
(a "property right") when other uses have not been taken. This inclusion is
perhaps significant because the open-ended inclusion of "property rights"
might allow for the doctrine of "conceptual severance" that has been
rejected in U.S. courts.127 Allowing for conceptual severance, on its own,
would allow for a greater availability of regulatory takings claims than
under U.S. law. If one use of a piece of property were outlawed, the
investor could demand compensation even though productive uses of other
pieces remained available. This is largely academic, however, because
allowing the inclusion of conceptual severance in the understanding of
"investment" is at odds with the Model BIT's other provisions discussed
below.
3. Customary International Law
The Annexes are where the primary change and clarification of
"expropriate" comes when compared to NAFTA. 128  The Annexes do
several things. First, Annex A, discussed above, affirms that the treaty
relies upon customary international law, not "international law" per se.
Next, Annex B flatly states that the expropriation protections of the treaty
are "intended to reflect customary international law concerning the
obligation of States with respect to expropriation."o3 0  Under this broad
assertion, even if the text of Article 6.1 were textually different from the
standard of customary international law, that standard would still govern, at
least insofar as the standard must be "reflect[ed]."'
Of course, as discussed above, discerning what actually is "the
obligation of States with respect to expropriation" under customary
international law is not for the faint of heart. 32 Because the answer is quite
murky, perhaps that murkiness should be taken into account when applying
it to the Model BIT's text. This would give arbitral panels a great deal of
wriggle room in interpreting Article 6.1, but would also perhaps prevent
126 Id
127 Matthew C. Porterfield, International Expropriation Rules & Federalism, 23 STAN.
ENvTL. L.J. 3, 16-21 (2004) (outlining the doctrine of conceptual severance).
128 Although classified as "Annexes" here, they have manifested themselves in other
forms, such as the side letters in the United States-Singapore FTA. See United States-
Singapore Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., Side Letter Exchanges on Customary
International Law and Expropriation, May 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M., 1026 (2004), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/singapore-fta/final-text
129 See NAFTA, supra note 33, at sec. IlI.B.
130 U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY, supra note 103, at Annex B.
131 Id.
132 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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them from reaching too far to one side or the other in finding or not finding
expropriations.
In any case, this does not end the matter on what "expropriation"
means. Even though Annex B at first states that the Model BIT's
expropriation provisions are meant to "reflect" customary international law,
it goes on to further define those expropriation provisions.133 The drafters
could have stopped there and left it to the future arbitral tribunals to simply
apply "customary international law" to claimed takings. Instead, they
qualified the above-discussed definition of "investment."l 3 4 Annex B.2
states: "An action or a series of actions by a Party cannot constitute an
expropriation unless it interferes with a tangible or intangible property right
or property interest in an investment."13' This language does not rule out
regulatory takings or even conceptual severance. However, it does rule out
any understanding that "investment" means something other than
property.136 Such a result has been suggested in some NAFTA tribunals
where a company's market share was hinted to be an "investment" under
NAFTA.'3 7
4. The Model BIT's Use ofPenn Central
The most important change lies in Annex B.3. It states: "Article 6.1
[the expropriation provision] addresses two situations. The first is direct
expropriation, where an investment is nationalized or otherwise directly
expropriated through formal transfer of title or outright seizure."3  This
"first situation" is a physical taking, recognized in the United States under
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,'139  as requiring
compensation from the government. Even under customary international
law, such an action is generally recognized as a taking requiring
140
compensation.
Next comes Annex B.4. It discusses the "second situation" and is
worth quoting in full:
The second situation addressed by Article 6.1 is indirect
expropriation, where an action or series of actions by a Party has an




137 See, e.g., S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award supra note 121 (concluding that
Canada committed a regulatory taking in not allowing the claimant to enter the market of
selling PCPs).
138 U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY, supra note 103, at Annex B.3.
'" 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982).
14 See Barry Appleton, Regulatory Takings: The International Law Perspective, 11
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 35, 47 (2002) ("Physical takings will always require fair market
compensation.").
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effect equivalent to direct expropriation without formal transfer of
title or outright seizure.
(a) The determination of whether an action or series of actions
by a Party, in a specific fact situation, constitutes an indirect
expropriation, requires a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry that
considers, among other factors:
(i) the economic impact of the government action,
although the fact that an action or series of actions by a
Party has an adverse effect on the economic value of an
investment, standing alone, does not establish that an
indirect expropriation has occurred;
(ii) the extent to which the government action interferes
with distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations;
and
(iii) the character of the government action.
(b) Except in rare circumstances, nondiscriminatory regulatory
actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect
legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health,
safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect
*141expropriations.
The three steps of Annex B.4(a) are taken directly from Penn
Central.142 The provision tells us that when a physical taking has not
occurred, we should use the Penn Central test; it then additionally warns us
that as long as the action is nondiscriminatory, a regulatory taking will only
be found in "rare circumstances."l4 3
At first this language appears to rule out any successful regulatory
takings claims that would not succeed under U.S. law. For one thing,
Annex B does not mention the Lucas exception of per se regulatory takings
where a regulation has permanently taken all economic value of property.
If an action might not constitute a regulatory taking even when 100% of the
economic use has been expropriated then the law seems prima facie less
protective than U.S. law. However, a closer reading of Annex B.4
illustrates that there might be more room for regulatory takings claims.
First, the proviso in Annex B.4(b), which states that successful
141 U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY, supra note 103, at Annex B.4.
142 Compare U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY, supra note 103, with Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
143 U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY, supra note 103, at Annex B.4(b).
144 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm'n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030-31 (1992) (stating that a
permanent deprivation of all economic value is a per se taking unless the deprivation is made
through background principles of common law).
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regulatory takings claims will be "rare," might actually help in making a
regulatory takings claim. It does not say "extremely uncommon" or "very
unlikely," but simply "rare." 45 These alternative descriptions arguably
better define U.S. takings law, where a successful Penn Central claim is
hard to come by. One study provides a hint at what that success rate might
be.146 Its authors took a random sampling of cases that applied Penn
Central on the merits.147  Of those cases only 13.4% concluded that the
government had committed a regulatory taking. 148 As the authors noted,
this does not mean that 13.4% of the time that an owner claims she is
harmed by a land use regulation does a regulatory taking occur, as many
property owners might not have the resources to bring a challenge, and
many challenges may settle short of judgment.149 It does, however, provide
a window into how "rare" the finding of a regulatory taking can be.
Whether 13.4% is less than "rare" and therefore less favorable to investors
than the Model BIT's standard, is in the eye of the interpreter. If an arbitral
tribunal were to find that "rare" means something akin to 25% of all
challenges, then the test of Annex B.4(b) could be more conducive to
property owners than the law in the United States. Alternatively, if "rare"
equals 2% then U.S. law is much stricter in comparison.
Second, although the test is drawn from Penn Central, it is not
beholden to Penn Central itself. It is not a part of a larger case and its
specific facts, but a provision of a treaty with no specific facts. Also, the
interpretation of an international treaty is not beholden to the case law of
one (and only one) of the treaty's signatories. Things might be a bit
different if the type of regulation at issue in Penn Central were referenced
in the Model BIT's text, but that is not the case either. Penn Central
concerned a historic preservation law.150 Annex B.4(b) only alludes to laws
"designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such
as public health, safety, and the environment."' If the aim of a law were
something other than "legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public
health, safety, and the environment" would it not be "rare" to find a
regulatory taking? Would historic preservation be such an objective?
Would rent-seeking for a preferred industry?l 52 The Model BIT offers few
145 U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY, supra note 103, at Annex B.4(b).
146 F. Patrick Hubbard, Shawn Deery, Sally Peace & John P. Fougerousse, Do Owners
Have a Fair Chance of Prevailing Under the Ad Hoc Regulatory Takings Test of Penn
Central Transportation Company?, 14 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 121, 141 (2003)
(reviewing 133 randomly selected cases citing Penn Central).
147id
148 id
149 Id. at 142-43 (contextualizing survey data).
Iso Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 116 (1978).
151 U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY, supra note 103, at Annex B.4(b).
152 An example of "rent-seeking" might be a law requiring the use of chemical A, and not
chemical B, in a certain industrial process, where it is undisputed that chemical A is not
364
Exporting the Penn Central Test
30:339 (2010)
clues for an answer.
Additionally, Annex B does not state what level of scrutiny to apply to
a law in determining whether it has "legitimate public welfare
objectives.""' This does not mean that tribunals have carte blanche review
a la that imputed to the Lochner court in deciding what is in the interest of
the public welfare. 154 That cannot seriously be imputed to its drafters. It
does mean, however, that the extreme deference under U.S. law afforded
legislatures in presuming that a law almost always does have a legitimate
public welfare objective need not be present in an arbitral panel interpreting
a BIT under Annex B.
The above analysis demonstrates a muddle. Keeping in mind the
ambiguity of Annex B.4(b)'s "rare circumstances" provision, the
provision's uncertain connection to Penn Central, the uncertainty behind
the meaning of "legitimate public welfare objectives," the definition of
"property," and the directive to interpret all of these with "customary
international law" in mind, the meaning of the Model BIT's expropriation
provision itself-Article 6.1-becomes quite complicated. This is in
addition to deciphering the meaning of the original Penn Central test itself.
Therefore, not only is the meaning of Penn Central itself exceedingly
vague, but the meaning of Article 6.1-with all the cross-talk of "property,"
"customary international law," and "rare circumstances"-is even more
vague. In comparison, judging whether a regulatory taking occurs under
NAFTA seems relatively simple. The Model BIT's expropriation provision
fails to provide something basic to its existence: provide investors a
standard to judge when they will, and will not, be protected from regulation
of their investments.
IV. DOES THE INCLUSION OF THE PENN CENTRAL TEST IN A BIT
HELP PROMOTE FDI?
A. The Empirical Debate Over BITs' Promotion of FDI
The question this article is concerned with is not whether BITs are
better for the environment or human heath than chemical B, but where chemical A is
manufactured by a politically-connected corporation, whereas chemical B is not. If a foreign
investor could show that the only reason for the regulation was favoritism toward the
producer of chemical A, and thus was not a legitimate public welfare objective, would it be
easier to establish a regulatory taking? The text of B.4(b) seems to point in that direction.
Id. Of course, this might all be moot because such favoritism would likely not survive the
protection of a national treatment clause. One could imagine, however, a scenario where the
producers of both chemicals were foreign. Then, only a substantive protection-above and
beyond a national treatment clause-would allow for a finding of a regulatory taking.
153 Id.
154 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see generally David E. Bernstein,
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"good." The question is rather, given that BITs are entered into to promote
FDI, does the inclusion of the Penn Central test further that goal? As stated
earlier, some legal treatments of BITs have sought to address why BITs are
"good" without keeping in mind why we have BITs in the first place.1's
How BITs may hinder objectives such as domestic environmental
legislation is an interesting issue, but a thorough treatment of the issue
would weigh the impact on environmental legislation, health and safety
laws, etc., against the possible benefits that BITs, in the form of additional
FDI, bring to a host country.is5
The ideal way to consider whether the Penn Central test furthers FDI
would be to compare the flow of FDI into countries that have signed a BIT
with the United States that includes a version of the Penn Central test with
the flow of FDI into similar countries in the same time period that also have
a BIT with the United States which does not include the test. For good
measure, a control group of countries that lack BITs with the United States
altogether would also be used. Unsurprisingly, such figures do not exist, or
are at least extremely hard to find. This is because the new Model BIT (the
version that includes Penn Central) has only been around a few years and
few countries have entered into BITs incorporating it. In addition, only U.S.
FDI could be considered in examining the flow of FDI into those countries
because the Model BIT would not govern FDI from other countries. Only
considering FDI from U.S. investors, however, makes the data more
susceptible to local variances than considering worldwide FDI.15 1
Moreover, such a small sample size of "similar countries" during the same
time period would be hard to find.
A great deal of data exists on BITs more generally and their
relationship to FDI. Here the results are varied. Economists either
conclude that BITs are marginally beneficial at best or that they provide for
substantial returns on FDI. It is not the purpose of this article, nor the
expertise of the author, to evaluate the merits of the statistical analysis in
these empirical studies. Some findings in the literature, however, can assist
the instant project.
For example, three major studies on the relationship between BITs and
FDI alternatively claim that the results are inconclusive or that BITs are
marginally beneficial for increased FDI.'15 One study concluded that there
155 See supra notes 40-52 and accompanying text (discussing lack of perspective in
remembering that BITs are entered into specifically to promote FDI).
156 Some articles on the subject do address that question to a limited extent. See, e.g.,
Been & Beauvais, supra note 13, at 116-17 (arguing that developing countries can better
increase FDI through other strategies).
157 Such local variances might include a large immigrant population from the host
country living in the United States, thus familiar with the host country's economy and
investing more FDI than would otherwise occur with an inadequate expropriation treaty.
With worldwide FDI such variances would more likely even out.
158 See Rose-Ackerman & Tobin, supra note 11 (results inconclusive); Neumayer &
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is not enough data to come to a conclusion.15 9 Another concluded that BITs
might actually inhibit FDI to a small degree.160 However, a third concluded
that when a larger sample was examined, BIT signings correlated with
increased FDI. Importantly, the study found that BITs that included explicit
language submitting host countries to the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals
witnesses increased FDI.161 The conclusion was that the stronger the
language committing a country to arbitration, the more likely that the BIT
would increase FDI in the country.162
Intuitively this finding makes sense. BITs seek to provide some
measure of assurance to investors that there will be an additional recourse
(additional to other existing ones, such as insurance) to turn to in the case of
expropriation. As stated earlier, private enforcement through an arbitral
tribunal is what removes the relief promised through a BIT from the always
precarious political field, and-because the tribunal need not be located in
the host country nor composed of its citizens-away from the whims of the
host country's legal system.163 The more enforceable this important part of
the BIT, the more likely it is that the BIT will convince investors that it will
protect them, thus promoting FDI.
Similar reasoning should apply to other provisions of BITs. All other
things being equal, the stricter the protections of a BIT on what the
government can do to investors the more likely investors will invest. The
weaker the protections, the less likely investors will invest. This much
seems fairly non-controversial. More complicated is when the language in
a BIT is not "strict" or "weak" but ambiguous. Ambiguity brings
discretion-whether to grant deference to the host government, whether to
use drafting history and statements made by the negotiators, what public
policies to promote, how similar provisions have been interpreted, etc. A
prospective investor must consider some or all of these in predicting
whether a BIT provides enough protection that it makes a difference in
whether to invest in a host country. On balance, the more that must go into
the investor's consideration, the more uncertain the answer. This might not
mean that an investor thinks a BIT does not protect its investment. After
all, an ambiguous expropriation provision is presumably better to the
investor than none at all. However, it does mean that an investor will be
Spess, supra note 17 (results show increase in FDI, particularly with strong binding
arbitration clauses); Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract
Foreign Investment? Only a Bit-and They Could Bite, in THE EFFECTS OF TREATIES ON
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION
TREATIES, & INVESTMENT FLOwS 374-75 (Karl P. Sauvant and Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009)
(arguing that BITs might actually slightly inhibit FDI).
159 See Rose-Ackerman & Tobin, supra note 11, at 31.
160 Hallward-Driemeier, supra note 158, at 374-75.
161 Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, supra note 17, at 226.
162 id.
163 See supra note 37.
367
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 30:339 (2010)
less sure of what protection is there.
B. A Defense of Vagueness
As explained above, the Penn Central test as it exists in the Model BIT
is a "model" of ambiguity. It is a test originally drafted by a U.S. court,
taken partly from prior U.S. case law and partly from utilitarian theory,
grafted into international treaties that make no mention of its genealogy,
and intended to reflect "customary international law," something itself so
ambiguous that treaties must turn around and look to mechanisms such as
Penn Central to give it effect. The entire circular enterprise merely adds
more and more layers of vagueness to the provision's meaning. When
faced with the Model BIT, it is hard to imagine that an investor would
think: "I know when this treaty will, and will not, protect me against a
regulatory taking."
Before proceeding to a possible remedy of the Model BIT's regulatory
takings language, it is necessary to address those who defend it precisely
because it is vague. The most thorough defense of the Penn Central test's
inclusion in BITs comes from Professor Marc R. Poirier. In two articles,
first on va Veness in regulatory takings in Fifth Amendment
jurisprudence' and later applying that analysis to regulatory takings in the
international arena,165 Poirier argues (1) property is an evolving construct,
and so creating a "one size fits all" approach to regulatory takings doctrine
is inappropriate;166 and (2) when takings law is applied across national
boundaries through BITs, the differences in conceptions of property
become even more profound and we should be even more weary of bright-
line tests in evaluating regulatory takings.167
Poirier's conception of property as an evolving concept is well
recognized and hard to find fault with. Technological change, for example,
gives us new forms of property that are difficult to pigeonhole into the old
forms.'6 8  For example, how does a flight-path over another's field fit
within the former property regime that recognized one's property as
extending up to the sky? Who "owns" a virtual character in an online
gaming program: the software developer or the game player? As long as
there have been changes in society, technological or cultural, there have
16 Poirier, supra note 88.
165 Poirier, supra note 20.
66 Poirier, supra note 88, at 101 ("The article explores the sources of vagueness in
takings doctrine, and argues that they can be understood in part as a consequence of the
socially constructed nature of property.").
167 Poirier, supra note 20, at 860 ("When we understand regulatory takings doctrine as
part of a process of transition management for property rules, we can see why it ought to
remain substantively vaguer and procedurally slower and more transparent than foreign
investors or other property owners would like.").
168 See Poirier, supra note 88, at 176-78 (discussing the new forms of property that
sprung out of new social practices).
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been needs for property rights to adapt. Poirier thinks that when takings
law is applied to property, it is best to leave the definition of a "taking"
vague because it allows for the parties involved-the landowner, the
authorities, the environmentalists, etc.-to have a conversation on what is
the right course of action.169 A clear takings line in the sand does not allow
for this conversation to develop. Further, without vague takings law the
conception of property may remain stagnant because such a conversation
needs to go forward in order for property to evolve. 170 Further, Poirier
assumes that these changes and conversations arise out of the democratic
process. 7 1
Poirier's assumption that the democratic process shapes property
largely ignores the common law process as a method for adapting property,
but for good reason. 172  In the common law process, courts adjudicate
claims involving novel conceptions of property and, over the course of
time, arrive at new rules for how to fit the new modes or uses of property
alongside the old ones. 73 Poirier does discuss this process, and the process
of social change outside the law, but does not make it central to how the
understanding of property changes. 174
Poirier largely leaves the common law process out as a method for
evaluating new conceptions of property because he is not really talking
about what common law judges adjudicate: private law. Takings doctrine,
of course, is a concern of public law, of how the state is administered, both
internally-how the government governs itself-and externally-how the
government relates to private parties. Generally, when concerned with what
constitutes a taking, courts examine the relevant private law (in the United
States, usually state law) to determine what is property, but then examine
the Fifth Amendment-a form of public law-to determine if the
government, in its relation to the private party, took that property. 175 In
'9 Id. at 132-33 (describing the need to repeatedly "renegotiate" property regimes).
170 Id. at 178.
171 See Poirier, supra note 88, at 180 (discussing wide agreement among scholars that the
democratic process lends legitimacy to changes in property rights).
172 Poirier does briefly discuss "Burkean" considerations, but does not elaborate on these.
By this it seems he means a degree of reverence for existing institutions, a central tenet of
the English political thinker Edmund Burke. Poirier argues that his approach holds-some
appeal to those of this ilk as "[e]ven a certain kind of Burkean conservatism expresses faith
in social democratic process." Id. at 181.
173 See Todd J. Zywicki & Anthony B. Sanders, Posner, Hayek & the Economic Analysis
of Law, 93 IOWA L. REv. 559, 599-600 (2008) (describing the spontaneous order process of
law arising out of social interaction).
174 Poirier does rightly point out that many property theorists do not do this at all. See
Poirier, supra note 88, at 165 ("An entire generation of policy prescribers-typically,
although not always, grounded in law and economics-seems to have simply forgotten about
informal practice, either as an alternative to formal regulation, or as the substrate within
which baseline norms take root and achieve legitimacy.").
' See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980) (stating that the
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recommending vagueness in takings law, Poirier calls for vagueness in the
second determination, not the first.'7 6 Poirier primarily discusses how the
state will regulate "property" and how in promulgating regulations,
especially environmental regulations, the new rules should emerge from a
conversation between interested parties that are not restricted by a clear
regulatory takings standard.177 Poirier does discuss how the definition of
property changes, but as it relates to the state, largely leaving out mere
relations between individuals.'7  Whether or not something is "property" is
not his concern. His concern is whether the state has to provide
compensation when it regulates that "property."579
C. Spontaneous Order and the Private Law/Public Law Distinction
1. Rules of Just Conduct vs. Rules of Organization of Government
Contrary to Poirier, it may be that the first question-what is
property-demands a vague (or at least vaguer) answer, and that the second
question-was the property taken-demands a clear (or at least clearer)
answer. For an exploration of this distinction a useful source is F.A.
Hayek's trilogy Law, Legislation andLiberty.80 Hayek, trained both in law
and economics, came later in life to see private law as, ideally, a body of
rules that come into being spontaneously.' That is, they arise not because
judges or legislators create them with a purpose in mind, but because the
rules have already come to be accepted and relied on in society.182
Although not intentionally created, they are tools that people use to
peaceably interact with each other. Hayek termed this a "spontaneous
United States, unlike the States themselves, does not possess the residual authority to define
property). But see Roderick E. Walston, The Constitution & Property: Due Process,
Regulatory Takings, & Judicial Takings, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 379, 404-05 (arguing that in
light of Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), the Court has implied that
state common law defines property, but that state legislative enactments are not as relevant).
176 See, e.g., Poirier, supra note 88, at 178 (discussing the change in property rights
resulting from the ability of airplanes to fly over one's land as utilizing takings and nuisance
law).
177 Id. at 103 ("[T]hese assorted benefits from vagueness in regulatory takings doctrine
are likely to accrue only if the citizens affected by regulatory takings have faith in societal
dialogue and come to view themselves as participants.").
178 See supra notes 175-76.
179 See Poirier, supra note 88, at 185 (analyzing evolutionary change in property rights in
the context of how takings and due process protect those unfairly affected by the change, not
regarding how the "property" changes without relation to the government).
180 This discussion will primarily draw upon the first work of the trilogy, F.A. HAYEK, 1
LAW, LEGISLATION & LIBERTY: RULES & ORDER (1973).
181 See Zywicki & Sanders, supra note 172, at 599-600 (describing the spontaneous
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order."' 84 In Adam Ferguson's famous formulation, these rules "are the
result of human action, but not the execution of any human design."8 s For
Hayek, the English common law is an example of such a spontaneous order:
it arose through a multitude of individual decisions by individual courts that
merely enforced the law accepted by their surrounding communities.' 86 The
law provided for greater certainty concerning where the lines fell between
people's property, and in providing this greater certainty people could use
those lines to interact with each other to trade and plan for the future.'8
However, they evolved over time when new circumstances arose, reflecting
how the larger society adapted and incorporated these new circumstances,
such as recognizing new forms of property. Hayek termed these legal
tools that individuals used in relating with each other "rules of just
conduct." 89
Very different from these "rules of just conduct" are what Hayek
termed "rules of organization of government."l90 Hayek was by no means
an anarchist and recognized that there were legitimate functions for the
government to perform. In performing these functions the government
needs rules. Some of these rules are as simple as the line-items in the
budget, 9' while others are broader, defining how the government relates to
its citizens. Hayek expressed dismay at how in the modern world, and
especially in socialist countries, public law was replacing private law,
making much of human behavior a matter of an individual's relationship
with the state and not with other individuals.192
A review of Hayek's ideas on public law demonstrate that he held the
rules for the administration of government should be clear in their
application. This is because public law "is not law in the sense of rules
defining what kind of conduct is generally right, but consists of directions
concerning what particular officers or agencies of govemment are required
to do."' 93 Conversely, this would also include rules on what officers or
184 HAYEK, supra note 179, at 38 (outlining the characteristics of a spontaneous order).
185 ADAM FERGUSON, AN ESSAY ON THE HISTORY OF CIVIL SCIENCE, §.2 at 122 (Duncan
Forbes, ed. 1966) (originally published 1767).
186 See HAYEK, supra note 179, at 84-85 (describing how English common law retained
the ancient understanding of law as the law of the custom of the community).
187 id.
188 Id. at 65-66 (describing how law evolves, and lawyers' role in the evolution).
189 Id. at 131-32; see also Zywicki & Sanders, supra note 172, at 600 (discussing how
law changes in society, but more slowly than other institutions in society, such as the
economy, technology, and social mores).
190 Id. (contrasting the two forms of rules).
191 In fact, Hayek remarked "most of a budget, so far as it concerns expenditure, will not
contain any rules at all." HAYEK, supra note 179, at 136.
192 Hayek placed criminal law under the rubric of private law as it generally conforms to
the background "rules of just conduct" held by society, and did not belong under the rules of
organization of government. See id at 132.
19 Id at 133.
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agencies of government are required not to do, such as not to diminish
property value by regulation. For private actors to have some measure of
certainty about when the government will inhibit them from acting (or force
them to act) they need relatively clear rules on what the government can do
and what it cannot.
The need for certainty in an individual's relationship with the
government may well be greater than in his relationship with private actors.
This is because an individual is generally in less of a position, to put it
mildly, to negotiate terms with the government than with another party.194
When parties are relatively equal in size and resources this is assuredly true,
and when one is more powerful than another, such as with an individual and
a large corporation, then at least both are generally subject to market
forces.'" Governments, on the other hand, are predominately not subject to
market forces, and generally have little input from their citizens, as opposed
to a small cadre of lobbyists, as to the specifics of a proposed law.196 These
considerations bring us to the conclusion that there is a greater need for
clarity in public law, including regulatory takings standards, than in private
law. The clearer the "rules for the organization of government," the better
private actors may plan their behavior without having to guess how the
government will treat them. Again, although clarity is to be valued in the
private law, its application may be negotiated by the affected parties. An
example from public law is the expectation of how the Fifth Amendment
inhibits the issuance of a new environmental regulation. In this regard, the
Lucas standard-whatever faults it may have-gives clearer guidance than
Penn Central. The first clearly commands the government to pay
compensation when it deprives a property owner of all of a property's
economic value; the second gives some hazy guidance on when a taking
might otherwise occur.
2. The Rule ofLaw
Scholars of this area may at this point ask why we are not discussing a
fundamental concept: the Rule of Law. The classical understanding of this
concept, for Hayek as much as for anyone, is that the rule of law requires
194 Think of the vast difference in negotiations between a person negotiating with another
private party as to the specifics of a contract, and a person lobbying the legislature or an
agency as to the specifics of a bill or regulation. Further, bilateral monopoly may often
apply in the case of the former instance, but nothing approaching that level of equality
applies in the latter.
' The author wishes to clarify that he is not aware whether Hayek specifically discussed
how individuals can negotiate with each other within vaguer rules than they can with the
government. However, this conclusion is compelled by Hayek's other words on the public-
private law distinction. See HAYEK, supra note 179, at 132.
196 See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT
283 (1962) (discussing the public choice approach to governmental action and the incentives
of governmental actors when faced with special interest pressure groups).
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predictable legal rules that parties can look to in planning their activities.197
The reason why this discussion avoids the "Rule of Law," and the extensive
literature on the subject in the regulatory takings field, is because this
analysis seeks to demonstrate that even if the value of the rule of law is not
jealously guarded otherwise, it must be in the context of BITs and
regulatory takings. Conflicts over regulatory takings seem to always result
in a face-off between the supposed sanctity of the rule of law and the
supposed need for regulation. Indeed, Poirier sets up his defense of
vagueness as an alternative to "those subscribing to a classical liberal theory
of property" who believe that "the system works only when individual
property owners know ex ante just what they own and what the rules are for
use and exclusion."' 98  The present analysis need not jump into this
interminable debate. This is because even if one thinks the Fifth
Amendment should be interpreted to allow a great degree of regulation, and
that the "Rule of Law" is overrated, one should still value a clear takings
rule as opposed to a vague takings rule when the need for incentives-such
as those for FDI-are taken into account. This is especially the case with
BITs where the very reason for a treaty's existence is to produce incentives.
Even if the rule of law is not to be valued, it should be apparent that one of
its components--certainty in the future application of legal rules-will
provide greater incentives to parties to act.
3. The Distinction Between What Is Property and What Is a Taking
Returning to Hayek's private law/public law distinction, someone in
Poirier's camp may see this Hayekian critique as beside the point. At root
Poirier calls for a vague regulatory takings doctrine because it allows for the
government to negotiate with interested parties on what property rights the
owners should have.199 After that the Fifth Amendment should check the
government only if there is a great injustice, such as a large amount of
investment in property accompanied by very justifiably settled expectations.
Indeed, Poirier does not call for the abolition of a regulatory takings
doctrine as do some other property theorists.200 Poirier may recognize the
desire for certainty in dealing with the government, and in the distinction
between private and public law. However, he argues that there is a
countervailing interest in the government examining new conditions and not
being constrained in the exercise of its police power in meeting the
supposed challenges the new conditions pose.201 He generally provides
197 See F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 156-57 (1960) (arguing that the
predictability of legal rules is a central tenet of the Rule of Law).
198 Poirier, supra note 88, at 97-98.
...Id. at 190-91.
200 See id. at 178 ("Takings Doctrine serves as one of a number of safety valves that
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environmental examples, such as new scientific understandings of the
benefits of wetlands, and the hazards attendant to building on eroding
coastal islands.202 At the same time there is still the need for a regulatory
takings doctrine, but if we are to have one it should be vague. Poirier hears
concerns such as Hayek's regarding certaint7, but believes that they are
outweighed by the need to enable regulation.20
Poirier's concerns lose power when one parses out that it is public law
he is talking about, not private law. If private law, through a spontaneous
process, regulates the relations between private parties when new
conceptions of property arise, then there is much less of a need for
government having freedom to examine those new conceptions when it
regulates the private parties. If government regulators do not define what
property is then they do not need room to define it. They merely need room
to regulate that "property." The "conversation" that Poirier advocates can
go on between the private parties, either through the market or in the courts.
Governmental regulation of private parties, such as banning construction on
privately owned wetlands or imposing building moratoriums on eroding
coastal islands, must still be examined in the public law context. However,
this examination is after (conceptually, not necessarily chronologically) the
private law has determined what the "property" is. This regulatory
examination should then involve clear (which is not the same as stringent)
standards of what the government can do to the now-defined property. To
argue that this examination should be vague is really just to argue that the
government should have more power to regulate private property. The
underlying point is that there is no need for vagueness, a la Penn Central,
to give the government that power.
If protection of the environment is really Poirier's goal, why not a
permissive, yet clear takings rule? If Poirier wants to retain a residual
protection against governmental overreaching, a rational-basis standard
such as that used in the equal protection context can accomplish that end.m
Poirier's argument anticipates that rules of property will be made by
political actors through deliberative democracy. Hayek's conception of
private law removes this concern. Private parties have a "conversation"
regarding the scope of property in their multitude of interactions in civil
society. The concern that remains--clarity in the law-can then be served
202 See id. at 170 (providing examples of when the understanding of property should
change).
203 Another reason Poirier gives for vagueness is that concepts such as "property" and
"regulatory takings" are "essentially contested concepts" that we should allow our
democratic society to discuss. Id. at 134-37. He does not address why this cannot occur
through the common law process, and not through legislatures and agencies.
204 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (applying deferential rational
basis test, but nevertheless concluding that law banning local governments from extending
protection to homosexuals unconstitutional).
205 See Poirier, supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
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with a clear rule in regulatory takings-at least clearer than the Penn
Central test. Civil society (that is, society outside of the regulators) defines
property; the government then regulates that property under whatever
clear(er) takings standards the government chooses to set.
Now, many readers will consider the above perhaps pertinent to the
English common law of the Eighteenth Century, but naYve in today's
statutory era, and indeed beside the point to civil law countries whose
property rules are embodied in legislation. To some degree this is a valid
criticism, and, indeed, Hayek recognized the blurring of the lines between
public and private law, especially in Continental European jurisprudence.20 6
However, the distinction is still germane for two reasons. First, even when
property rules are legislatively determined, when private parties are
negotiating who owns what--even if a statute, instead of the common law,
determines the "shape" of the property-negotiation, in individual cases
and market-wide, may still facilitate compromise on the scope of property
rights. Second, although civil law systems rely on legislation to define
property rights, that legislation often merely codifies existing law. Bruno
Leoni, a thinker very close to Hayek in his view of the common law
process, defended the traditional Justinian Code by pointing out that the
Code sought to express in legislation what was already followed in
society.207 A similar case can be made for much (although not all) of the
Uniform Commercial Code and other "codifications."20 8
D. Why BITs Are Not, and Should Not Be, the Fifth Amendment
Poirier applies his vagueness ideas to BITs in a follow-up piece, The
NAFTA Chapter 11 Expropriation Debate Through the Eyes of a Property
Theorist. 209 There he makes a similar argument, but with a new twist.
Along with the arguments for a vague takings doctrine outlined above, he
further points out that different countries have, of course, different
conceptions of property and different traditions (different forms of "nomos"
206 HAYEK, supra note 179, at 133-34 (lamenting the loss of the distinction).
207 See BRUNO LEONI, FREEDOM & THE LAW 139 (1961) (explaining the codification
process of the Justinian Corpus Juris). Leoni states "[A] strict connection between the ideal
of the Corpus Juris as a written law and the common or unwritten law actually embodied in
it was strikingly evidenced by the content of the Corpus. Indeed, the central and more
lasting part of it, the so-called Pandectae or Digesta, consisted entirely of statements of the
old Roman jurists relating to the unwritten law." Id.
208 See, e.g., Homer Kripke, Law & Economics: Measuring the Economic Efficiency of
Commercial Law in a Vacuum of Fact, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 929, 972 n.154 (1985) ("The
UCC, however, merely codified and simplified prior commercial practice-it does not alter
the nature of credit transactions."). But see Gunther A. Weiss, The Enchantment of
Codification in the Common-Law World, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 435, 466-67 (2000) (arguing
that codification always changes the substance of law to at least some degree, even when
legislatures merely seek legislation to reflect existing law).
209 Poirier, supra note 20.
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210
as he terms it) in how the countries' governments can regulate property.
Further, different countries, and, even more so, different localities have
different environmental and other regulatory needs.2 1 1  For example, a
wetlands regulation might be greatly needed in one region due to the past
decimation of wetlands, but not in another region which is undeveloped and
where economic growth is of greater need. In the face of this diversity of
local laws and conditions stand BITs which generally have the same
application to all signatory countries. Not only do they have unvarying
application, but they are interpreted by arbitrators who are often not from
the host country, and therefore not necessarily familiar with the country and
locality's laws, customs, and conditions.212 This estrangement between the
governing law-the BIT-and the arbitrators on the one side, and the local
laws and conditions on the other, calls for vagueness in the BIT, argues
Poirier, so that the local needs and understandings can be properly
considered by the arbitrators in assessing whether the regulation in question
211
constitutes expropriation.
The following discusses two reactions to Poirier's application of
vagueness to BITs. First, different countries assuredly do sometimes have
quite different understandings of property. Hayek recognized that a rule of
law in one community might not work in another because the rule will have
to relate to other different rules not present in the first community.2 14 For
example, the rule of adverse possession may be set into the fabric of Anglo-
Saxon law, and therefore be workable in that system, but foreign to another
legal system where it would not function properly if integrated into that
system's property rules. 2 15  However, Poirier makes the issue more
complicated than necessary in his more basic point that BITs should include
vague standards that allow flexibility to properly take into consideration
210 Id at 875 ("A nomos represents both a community of like-minded individuals sharing
a way of life, and the world view that facilitates and expresses that way of life.").
211 Id. at 875-76 (discussing how local property norms arise out of the customs of the
relevant community).
212 Id. at 876-78 (discussing the culture of foreign investors and international arbitrators).
213 Id. at 907 (arguing that tribunals should "determine the difficult conflicts case by case,
on an all-things-considered basis"). For reasons discussed below, contrary to Poirier,
vagueness is not more relevant to BITs than to the Fifth Amendment. In fact the opposite is
true. However, Poirier does have a point regarding the use of foreign arbitrators. These
arbitrators, as they commonly are used in BIT regimes, are often not native to the country
involved and therefore often do not have full understandings of the host country's property
rights system. The reason for using "international" arbitrators, and arbitrators at all instead
of a signatory country's domestic court system, is to protect the foreign investor from a
"home field advantage." It is not in the scope of this article to assess the merits of either side
of this argument, but the author notes that both have currency.
214 See Zywicki & Sanders, supra note 172, at 576 (contrasting the concept of fiduciary
duty in the United States and Russia).
215 See id (discussing why the concept of fiduciary duty might work in societies placing
a high value on trust, but not in others).
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local laws and conditions.2 16 The country's civil society and legal system
determines what property "is," and then the BIT protects the foreign
investor's investment (the "property"). This is complicated because BITs
define what an investment is in some detail, such as with the Model BIT
described above,217 but the contours of property are still largely up to the
host country. For instance, the Model BIT defines "property" to include
"an enterprise." "Enterprise" is not defined, however, and so the arbitrators
218
may consult the host country's legal system to determine its meaning.
Second, for regulations that may effectively expropriate a foreign
investor's property, but that the host country contends are too important to
require paying the investor compensation, there is a very important
objection not present in the Fifth Amendment context. Poirier argues that
BITs may be, in the abstract, a good idea because foreign investors are in
need of some protection, just as domestic property owners are.2 19 However,
he also argues that a vague test is appropriate to allow flexibility in the host
country's regulatory regime.220 In fact, he assesses the incorporation of the
Penn Central test in the new Model BIT and concludes that the rule it
produces "sounds about right." 221 What this misses is something quite
basic, but something that must continually be repeated: BITs are entered
into to promote investment.
The Fifth Amendment arguably is about fairness, which is why Poirier
thinks some regulatory taking doctrine is worth having.222 BITs have little
to do with fairness. As discussed earlier, they are not environmental treaties
or any other type of treaties. If BITs, qua BITs, do not promote foreign
direct investment, then they are not worth entering into even if they are
"fair." Having a vague expropriation test may in some theoretical way
balance the regulatory needs of the government with those of foreign
investment and thus make "a normative statement," 223 but it does not
perform the practical task of satisfying the needs of foreign investors. If a
foreign investor confronts a vague takings test-such as the Model BIT
version of Penn Central-it will not greatly assist her in assessing the risk
of investing in the host country. There will still be great uncertainty as to
whether the investor will be protected from regulations that may diminish
216 See Poirier, supra note 20, at 907.
217 See supra, Part III.C.2.
218 This could, admittedly, be a problem if the arbitrators solely focus on international
economic understanding of the terms, or the understanding of a foreign legal jurisdiction.
219 Poirier, supra note 20, at 907 ("[M]aking a normative statement through legal
standards against the most invasive forms of government interference with private property
is important not only to international norms but to domestic property norms as well.").
220 id
221 Id. at 907-08 (approving the use of the Penn Central test in BITs).
222 Poirier, supra note 88, at 191.
223 Poirier, supra note 20, at 907.
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the value of her investment.224
In fact, it might even be better for an investor to invest in a country
where the takings protection is low, but clear, than one where the takings
protection is largely unquantifiable. A way to illustrate this is to leave
investment for a moment and look at two examples involving taxation. In
the first example, Company A settles in a jurisdiction that taxes profits at a
30% rate. With this knowledge in mind, Company A can plan its business
for the next year expecting that if it is able to make a profit it will have to
relinquish 30% of it. It may consider this too high and therefore structure
its operations so as to not earn much of a profit. It may instead consider
30% a relatively good deal, and turn a tidy, but taxed, profit. With either
choice it knows the rules it is working under. In the second example,
Company B settles in a jurisdiction that taxes "whatever is fair and
equitable" from corporate profits. This varies from year to year, so
Company B may sometimes only lose 10% or 20% in taxes, but in other
years may be socked with 40% or higher. Even if the average over time is
low, Company B cannot know ex ante the rate in any one year, and
therefore cannot effectively plan for its future. Its directors can only
consider whether to invest or take a larger profit based on probabilities
about the law, not on what the government has told it will be the law. This
is on top of the initial uncertainty of whether the company can even make a
profit in the jurisdiction in the first place.
The conundrum of Company B is the antithesis of certainty in the law,
and, indeed, of the rule of law: Company B cannot plan its future because it
does not know the rules. Company A, however, even though it may not like
the rules all that much, can assess what is expected of it and then move
forward knowing what the rules are.
With a version of the Penn Central test protecting a foreign investor,
the investor is in much the same position as Company B. The investor does
not know what protections it may have if the host government regulates its
investment so as to diminish its value, and therefore is uncertain about
whether or not to invest. It might be that it would win a regulatory takings
claim, but it very well might lose in arbitration and thus lose much of its
investment. A flat "no claims for regulatory takings" rule might even look
attractive in this environment, because then an investor will know there is a
high risk in investing in areas subject to regulation. Relevant examples in
such a regime might be potentially environmentally harmful activities, such
as the toxic waste storage at issue in the Metalclad award.225 A host
224 There are two levels of uncertainty here, of course. The first is whether the host
country will issue regulations that diminish the value of the investment. The second is if
such regulations are issued, whether the BIT will make the investor whole.
225 Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, 40 I.L.M. 36, 54 (NAFTA ch. 11 Arb.
Trib. Aug. 30, 2000) (awarding damages for not permitting the investor to use its investment
for waste storage).
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country could lose out in FDI if foreign investors chose not to invest in such
industries because of a "no claims will be paid" rule, but investors might
instead merely divert their FDI to ventures less subject to the swings of
226regulation.
A response to the above justification of clear regulatory takings rules
in BITs is that perhaps BITs are only concerned with increasing FDI, but
they should also be concerned with environmental protection, public health,
and the like. Therefore, a better BIT would recognize these goals and give
a host government deference in enacting regulations. Such a course is
already present in the Model BIT where it only allows for compensation in
the context of such regulations in "rare circumstances."227 Although well
meaning, this objection brings us right back to the vagueness principle. If
the intention of the treaty's drafters is to promote FDI then giving such
deference to the host government effectively neuters this purpose. Now, it
may be that regulatory takings protections in BITs have no impact on
whether foreign investors decide to invest or not.228 It may be that those
protections do indeed induce more FDI. In either case, however, crafting
regulatory takings protections in vague terms serves no purpose. If the
regulatory takings protections have no purpose then why have them in the
first place? If they do have an impact then they should actually induce
investors to invest, not keep them guessing as to how strong those
protections are.
This does not mean that BITs cannot balance regulatory takings
protections with regulatory goals such as environmental protection. It
merely means that this should not be done with a vacuous test such as Penn
Central. Another means of balancing the two objectives would be to
provide a clear (or at least "reasonably" clear) line at which a police power
action becomes a regulatory taking. One example raised here for the sake
of discussion, but not necessarily endorsed, is to state in a BIT that a
compensable regulatory taking occurs when a governmental action reduces
the value of an investment by 90%.229 In this scenario, if a regulation, such
as a ban on the use of an industrial chemical, reduces the value of a plot of
land by 50%, no compensation is required. If that plot of land were so tied
to that chemical, however, so that any other use of the land would be worth
only ten cents or less on the dollar as compared to a greater amount with
226 This assumes that BITs would still protect foreign investors through clear national
treatment clauses, and expropriation clauses protecting them from physical takings. The
uncertainty alleviated through the enforcement of these protections sets a baseline of
protection that a hazy regulatory takings test might not add very much to.
227 U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY, supra note 103, at Annex B.4(b).
228 See supra, Part IV.A.
229 Such a percentage cap has been a common proposal in state legislatures. See Carl. P.
Marcellino, Note, The Evolution of State Takings Legislation & The Proposals Considered
During the 1997-98 Legislative Session, 2 NYU J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 143, 154-56 (1998)
(reviewing proposed legislation ranging from 20% to 50% takings caps).
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that chemical in use, then a regulatory taking would have occurred and the
host government would be responsible for the value of the loss. This would
be a spin on the Lucas rule, but with a hard-and-fast number.
It may be argued that such a rule would create odd regulatory planning
where a government could-with impunity from a BIT's expropriation
clause-carefully regulate right up to the edge of a taking. For example, a
local government could regulate away 89% of a foreign investor's value in
a business, making sure it left the investor just enough that it could not sue
under the BIT. A protection against this, however, would be the relevant
BIT's national treatment clause. If the local government really were
regulating right up to 89% of the foreign investor's interest, then unless
there are a number of domestic investors with the same loss the foreign
investor could that argue its status as a foreign investor is driving the
regulation. Further, given that in most instances there would, relatively, not
be that many foreign investments covered by a particular BIT in one local
jurisdiction, and they may not even be widely known as "foreign"
investments, the practice of regulating right up to the "89% line" would not
be often utilized.
Opponents of regulatory takings protections might also argue that even
a 90% rule (or 50%, or whatever the number may be) does not allow for
important environmental, or other, regulations that are unforeseeable at the
time the BIT is enacted. The government, goes this objection, should have
the flexibility to implement such a regulation if it proves necessary for the
furtherance of important goals. However, a 90% rule does allow for
governments to implement regulations that reduce an investment's value by
90%. It merely requires the government to pay for the investor's loss. The
setting of the line at 90% is the act of balancing the police power with the
promotion of FDI. If a host government is to have unfettered ability to
regulate without worry, as long as it adheres to principles of national
treatment, then there is less incentive for a foreign investor to invest in the
host country. If BITs do actually promote FDI, and if FDI is to be valued,
then the host government must relinquish some of its power to regulate
without providing compensation. To argue, as some scholars do,230 that a
compensation requirement is harsh because many affected entities, such as
local governments in developing countries, do not have the funds to pay for
such regulatory takings claims, is to argue (again, assuming that BIT
regulatory takings provisions actually promote FDI) that those countries
must choose between those regulations and more FDI. This indeed might
be the case. Perhaps the country should make the choice not to adopt the
BIT. However, to argue that we can split the baby by means of a vague
standard such as the Penn Central test ignores the incentives that an
effective BIT should send to prospective foreign investors.
230 See, e.g., Been & Beauvais, supra note 13, at 38.
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CONCLUSION
It may be that BIT regulatory takings protections in actual fact do not
increase FDI. This is a very real possibility, and the empirical evidence is
mixed on BITs' effectiveness. However, once a country chooses to use a
BIT to increase FDI certain forms of BITs will work better than others. The
above discussion has demonstrated that a clear rule on regulatory takings
gives potential foreign investors a benchmark by which they can assess
whether to invest. A hazy rule, such as that in Penn Central, as embodied
in the new Model BIT, adds uncertainty to an already uncertain investment
decision and is much less likely to increase FDI. Arguments centered on
the Fifth Amendment and the need for property to evolve do not take into
account that BITs are nothing more than methods of promoting FDI. As
attractive as these arguments may be in the context of regulatory takings
generally, they do not assist in creating BITs that provide incentives to
invest.
Countries engaged in BIT negotiations should examine the use of the
Penn Central test and ask: If increasing FDI is the goal, does Penn Central
give foreign investors an incentive to invest in a host country, or does it
equivocate between investment protection and the police power to such an
extent that no one can be sure what it means and whether it protects them?
If the latter is the correct answer, then a new standard must be developed.
This new standard need not necessarily sacrifice a host country's ability to
regulate. It must balance the scope of non-compensable regulation with
providing incentives for FDI prior to drafting the standard itself. It should
not make this balancing the standard itself. That simply punts the balancing
decision to arbitrators who then must interpret an open-ended and
unpredictable test such as Penn Central.
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